德州的HOA 罚款:法律怎么规定的

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州法

法条怎么规定的

小额诉讼上限

$20,000 in Texas justice court, exclusive of interest, and subject to two exclusions that matter in HOA disputes.

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Government Code Section 27.031(a)(1) gives the justice court original jurisdiction of "civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district or county court and in which the amount in controversy is not more than $20,000, exclusive of interest." Section 27.031(b)(4) bars the justice court from hearing "a suit for trial of title to land" and Section 27.031(b)(5) bars "a suit for the enforcement of a lien on land," so a fight over an assessment lien or a foreclosure must go to district court instead. Texas abolished the separate small claims court in 2013; these cases are now heard in justice court, including under the simplified small-claims procedures of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 500-507.

Texas is unusually favorable here because Property Code Section 209.017, added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 951 (S.B. 1588), Sec.

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21, effective September 1, 2021, creates an express venue for exactly this dispute: "An owner of property in a subdivision may bring an action for a violation of this chapter against the property owners' association of the subdivision in the justice court of a precinct in which all or part of the subdivision is located." A demand letter can credibly name this forum. Note the scope limit inside the sentence: it authorizes an action "for a violation of this chapter" -- Chapter 209 -- so it is available to a subdivision owner and not to a condominium unit owner, whose claim for relief arises instead under Section 82.161(a). Two jurisdictional limits to respect: Government Code Section 27.031(b)(4) bars the justice court from hearing "a suit for trial of title to land" and Section 27.031(b)(5) bars "a suit for the enforcement of a lien on land." So a dispute over the validity and amount of a fine fits comfortably in justice court, but a fight over an assessment lien or a foreclosure does not and must go to district court. Section 27.031(d) adds that "A corporation need not be represented by an attorney in justice court," so expect the association to appear through its manager rather than counsel.

法条编号

Texas Property Code Chapter 209, the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act, governs fines levied by a homeowners' association in a residential subdivision -- but only where the threshold conditions in Section 209.003 are met, and each is a condition an association can and does contest.

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Section 209.003(a): the chapter "applies only to a residential subdivision that is subject to restrictions or provisions in a declaration that authorize the property owners' association to collect regular or special assessments on all or a majority of the property in the subdivision." Section 209.003(b): "Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, this chapter applies only to a property owners' association that requires mandatory membership in the association for all or a majority of the owners of residential property within the subdivision subject to the association's dedicatory instruments." A voluntary-membership civic association is outside Chapter 209 entirely. Section 209.003(c) confirms the entity's label does not matter. Section 209.003(d): "This chapter does not apply to a condominium as defined by Section 81.002 or 82.003."

The core provision is Section 209.006 (Notice Required Before Enforcement Action), supported by Section 209.0061 (Association Policy; Fines) -- which by its own terms "does not apply to a property owners' association that is not authorized by the association's dedicatory instrument to levy a fine" (Sec. 209.0061(a)) and took effect January 1, 2024, and under H.B. 614 § 2 (Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 666) applies only to a fine that becomes due on or after that date — a fine that became due before it is governed by prior law -- Section 209.007 (captioned "HEARING BEFORE BOARD; ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION"; Sec. 209.007(e) expressly allows an owner or association to use alternative dispute resolution services), Section 209.008 (Attorney's Fees), Section 209.009 (Foreclosure Sale Prohibited in Certain Circumstances), and Section 209.017 (Justice Court Jurisdiction).

Condominiums are governed by Chapter 82 rather than Chapter 209, but Chapter 82 carries its own effective-date scope limit, so whether a citation to it holds depends on the declaration's recording date and, for an older declaration, on whether the condominium opted in. Section 82.002(a): "This chapter applies to all commercial, industrial, residential, and other types of condominiums in this state for which the declaration is recorded on or after January 1, 1994." A condominium declared before that date is governed by Chapter 82 in full only if the unit owners voted to amend the declaration to adopt it, or a declaration or amendment recorded before January 1, 1994 stated that Chapter 82 would apply in its entirety on January 1, 1994 (Sec. 82.002(a)(1)-(2)); otherwise Chapter 81, the Condominium Act, governs the regime (Sec. 81.0011(a)). For an older condominium that did neither, Section 82.002(c) applies only an enumerated subset of Chapter 82, and the fine notice-and-hearing subsection, Section 82.102(d), is NOT on that list. So Section 82.102(d) is the condominium fine-notice provision only where the declaration was recorded on or after January 1, 1994, or where the condominium opted in by one of the two routes Section 82.002(a)(1)-(2) allows; for a condominium declared before that date that never opted in, it is not available at all.

Two further provisions are frequently listed as support in HOA fine summaries, and both in fact run against the homeowner. Property Code Section 202.004 is the association's own best authority rather than a neutral standard of review: Section 202.004(a) presumes the association's exercise of discretionary authority reasonable unless the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that it was "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory," which is a burden the owner must carry; and Section 202.004(c) provides that "A court may assess civil damages for the violation of a restrictive covenant in an amount not to exceed $200 for each day of the violation" -- exposure that runs against the party found to have violated the covenant, which in a fine dispute is the owner. Property Code Section 5.006 is likewise one-directional: Section 5.006(a) mandates fees only to "a prevailing party who asserted the action," that is, the party that brought the covenant-enforcement claim, ordinarily the association, so a homeowner who prevails purely as a defendant is not entitled to fees under it. The fee provision that does run in the owner's favor is Section 209.008(b).

Section 209.006(a) is written as a precondition on the association's power, not as a mere procedural courtesy: "Before a property owners' association may suspend an owner's right to use a common area, file a suit against an owner other than a suit to collect a regular or special assessment or foreclose under an…

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association's lien, charge an owner for property damage, levy a fine for a violation of the restrictions or bylaws or rules of the association, or report any delinquency of an owner to a credit reporting service, the association or its agent must give written notice to the owner by certified mail." Section 209.006(b) then requires that the notice (1) describe the violation or property damage that is the basis for the suspension action, charge, or fine and state any amount due the association from the owner; (2) except as provided by Subsection (d), inform the owner of the conditional cure right, the right to request a hearing under Section 209.007 on or before the 30th day after the notice was mailed, and possible special rights or relief under federal law including the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act if the owner is serving on active military duty; (3) specify the date by which the owner must cure the violation if the violation is of a curable nature and does not pose a threat to public health or safety; and (4) be sent by verified mail.

Two independent off-switches qualify all of this and must be checked before any notice argument is asserted: Section 209.006(d) (the owner was previously given notice under Section 209.006 for that violation, and the opportunity to exercise rights under it, in the preceding six months) and Section 209.007(d) (the association filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief, or filed a suit that includes foreclosure as a cause of action).

Amendment history and currency. Section 209.006 was last amended by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 951 (S.B. 1588), Sec. 14, effective September 1, 2021. Section 209.0061 was added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 666 (H.B. 614), Sec. 1, effective January 1, 2024. Section 209.017 was added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 951 (S.B. 1588), Sec. 21, effective September 1, 2021. Chapter 209 as served by the Legislature's own file server carries five Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S. amendments (Ch. 10 / S.B. 711 and Ch. 79 / S.B. 2629, all effective September 1, 2025); none of them touches Section 209.006, 209.0061, 209.007, 209.008, 209.009, or 209.017 -- they reach Sections 209.00505, 209.00506, 209.00507, 209.0056, and 209.00592. Verified by direct scan of the chapter text on 2026-09-04.

Cap

Chapter 209 sets no cap on the dollar amount of an HOA fine. The chapter contains no maximum fine amount, no per-day limit, and no aggregate limit.

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It contains exactly two dollar figures, neither relating to fines: $2,500 in Section 209.008(f)(2), which is the floor of a limit on attorney's fees includable in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale (the limit is the greater of one-third of all actual costs and assessments, excluding attorney's fees, plus interest and court costs, or $2,500), and $50,000 in Section 209.0052(c), the threshold above which an association proposing to contract for services must solicit bids or proposals. Charges for association records are limited by Section 209.005(i), but by reference to the rates applicable for an item under 1 T.A.C. Section 70.3 rather than by any dollar figure in the statute. Chapter 82 likewise sets no dollar cap for condominiums; Section 82.102(a)(12) requires only that fines be "reasonable," and that power is itself defeasible because Section 82.102(a) opens "Unless otherwise provided by the declaration."

Two limits on that statement come from the text itself. The absence of a cap is established for Chapter 209, and for the Chapter 82 fine provisions quoted above; whether Texas law outside those chapters -- the reasonableness standard for restrictive covenants in Property Code Chapter 202, or Texas case law -- constrains the amount of a fine is not answered by them. And where a fine must be "reasonable," neither chapter says when an amount crosses into unreasonable: the statute does not settle the standard, and no reported decision is relied on here for it.

Section 202.004(c) provides: "A court may assess civil damages for the violation of a restrictive covenant in an amount not to exceed $200 for each day of the violation." That is a ceiling on what a COURT may award as civil damages against the party found to have violated a restrictive covenant.

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WARNING -- do not repeat the widespread error that Texas caps HOA fines at $200 per day.

It is not a cap on what an association may levy as a fine, and in a fine dispute the party accused of violating the covenant is the owner -- so surfacing this figure describes the owner's own exposure rather than a remedy. A demand letter that cites Section 202.004(c) as a fine cap is wrong on the law and hands the association an easy rebuttal.

The correct reasonableness levers, each with its limits. For subdivisions: Section 209.0061, which since January 1, 2024 requires the board to adopt an enforcement policy that must include "general categories of restrictive covenants for which the association may assess fines," "a schedule of fines for each category of violation," and "information regarding hearings described by Section 209.007," and to distribute it under Section 209.0061(d) by posting on an association website accessible to members or by annually sending a copy by hand delivery, first class mail, or e-mail to an address the owner provided. A fine that exceeds the association's own published schedule, or that is levied where no schedule was ever adopted or made available, is the strongest available attack on amount. Three limits travel with that argument: it cannot reach a fine that became due before January 1, 2024 (H.B. 614 § 2 keys the transition to the due date, not the levy date); Section 209.0061(a) exempts an association "that is not authorized by the association's dedicatory instrument to levy a fine" (though such an association has no fining power at all, which is a better defense); and Section 209.0061(c) expressly permits the policy to "reserve the board's authority to levy a fine from the schedule of fines that varies on a case-by-case basis," so a deviation from the schedule is not automatically unlawful where the policy reserved that discretion.

For condominiums: Section 82.102(a)(12) authorizes only "reasonable fines for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules of the association" and only "if notice and an opportunity to be heard are given in accordance with Subsection (d)." Section 82.102(c) adds that "To be enforceable, a bylaw or rule of the association must not be arbitrary or capricious" -- but that lever reaches only a condominium governed by Chapter 82 in full; Section 82.102(c) is not on the Section 82.002(c) list and so does not apply of its own force to a condominium declared before January 1, 1994 that never opted in.

Penalty

Chapter 209 imposes no statutory penalty, damages award, multiplier, or civil fine on a Texas HOA that violates Section 209.006. The chapter contains no provision awarding an owner statutory or actual damages for a defective fine notice, and no fee-shifting provision in the owner's favor for such a violation.

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That is a statement about Chapter 209 and nothing wider: whether Texas law outside the chapter supplies a separate claim against an association is not answered by these sections.

What the statute does not settle is the consequence of the failure. Section 209.006(a) is worded as a precondition on the association's power ("Before a property owners' association may ... levy a fine ... the association or its agent must give written notice"), and reading a fine levied without that notice as not validly assessed is the ordinary reading of the text. But no provision of Chapter 209 states that such a fine is uncollectable, and Section 209.006(e) bars a fine only in the different situation where the owner cured within the period for cure. The statute does not settle whether a fine levied without the required notice can still be collected, and no reported Texas decision on that point is relied on here.

Section 209.017 does give the owner a forum: an owner "may bring an action for a violation of this chapter against the property owners' association of the subdivision in the justice court of a precinct in which all or part of the subdivision is located." A violation of Section 209.006 is a violation of the chapter and so falls within that section. But Section 209.017 grants jurisdiction only; it names no remedy and no amount, so the text does not say what an owner can actually recover there.

For that reason, a letter can ask for the fine to be voided and removed from the ledger and explain why the structure of the statute supports that, without asserting that a court has so held, promising an outcome, or demanding a damages payment.

The concrete leverage a Texas owner does have, all of it non-monetary or defensive, and each item with its own limit.

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(1) Section 209.006(e): a timely cure means "a fine may not be assessed for the violation" -- the violation cured, not others.

(2) Section 209.008(b): "An owner is not liable for attorney's fees incurred by the association relating to a matter described by the notice under Section 209.006 if the attorney's fees are incurred before the conclusion of the hearing under Section 209.007 or, if the owner does not request a hearing under that section, before the date by which the owner must request a hearing." This kills the common tactic of stacking attorney's fees onto a disputed fine before the hearing has even happened. The same subsection adds: "The owner's presence is not required to hold a hearing under Section 209.007." So the association may proceed in the owner's absence: an owner who stays away does not stop the hearing from going forward.

(3) Section 209.009: "A property owners' association may not foreclose a property owners' association's assessment lien if the debt securing the lien consists solely of: (1) fines assessed by the association; (2) attorney's fees incurred by the association solely associated with fines assessed by the association; or (3) amounts added to the owner's account as an assessment under Section 209.005(i) or 209.0057(b-4)." The operative word is "solely" -- if the lien debt also includes delinquent assessments, this bar does not apply.

(4) Section 209.0063(a) sets a payment-application order in which "any reasonable fines assessed by the association" rank fifth, behind delinquent assessments, current assessments, and two categories of attorney's fees -- so an owner's payment cannot be steered to a disputed fine first. That order is defeasible: Section 209.0063(b) provides that if, at the time the association receives the payment, the owner is in default under a payment plan entered into with the association, the association "is not required to apply the payment in the order of priority specified by Subsection (a)" -- though even then "a fine assessed by the association may not be given priority over any other amount owed to the association."

(5) Section 209.017 gives the owner a forum: "An owner of property in a subdivision may bring an action for a violation of this chapter against the property owners' association of the subdivision in the justice court of a precinct in which all or part of the subdivision is located."

On attorney's fees, Section 5.006 is not an owner remedy. Section 5.006(a) provides that "In an action based on breach of a restrictive covenant pertaining to real property, the court shall allow to a prevailing party who asserted the action reasonable attorney's fees in addition to the party's costs and claim." The award is mandatory, but it runs to the party who asserted the covenant action -- ordinarily the association -- so it does not reward an owner who merely prevails as a defendant. For an owner, the section describes an exposure rather than a source of leverage. Condominium owners have a different fee position, two-way rather than owner-favorable: Section 82.161(b) provides that "The prevailing party in an action to enforce the declaration, bylaws, or rules is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation from the nonprevailing party," which also exposes a condominium owner who loses. Section 82.161 is on the Section 82.002(c) list, so it reaches pre-1994 condominiums as well.

Cap detail

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WARNING -- do not repeat the widespread error that Texas caps HOA fines at $200 per day.

Cure right

Texas gives a subdivision homeowner a right to cure before any fine can be levied -- but it is a CONDITIONAL right, subject to four separate limits, and the limits must be checked before the right is asserted.

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First, it applies only where "the violation is of a curable nature and does not pose a threat to public health or safety" (Sec. 209.006(b)(2)(A)); Section 209.006(f) adds that "a violation is considered a threat to public health or safety if the violation could materially affect the physical health or safety of an ordinary resident," and Section 209.006(g)-(i) supply the curability test and examples, with fireworks, a non-ongoing noise violation, property damage including the removal or alteration of landscape, and a prohibited garage sale expressly uncurable. Second, Section 209.006(d) removes Subsections (a) and (b) entirely for a violation for which the owner was previously given notice under Section 209.006, and the opportunity to exercise rights under it, in the preceding six months. Third, Section 209.007(d) switches off the notice and hearing provisions of both Section 209.006 and Section 209.007 where the association files a suit seeking a temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief, or files a suit that includes foreclosure as a cause of action. Fourth, no fixed number of days is guaranteed -- only a "reasonable period" (Sec. 209.006(c)). Where the right does apply, it is powerful: Section 209.006(e) provides that "If the owner cures the violation before the expiration of the period for cure described by Subsection (c), a fine may not be assessed for the violation." That is an absolute bar on the fine, not a discount -- but note the limit inside the sentence itself: it bars a fine "for the violation" cured, not any other charge or any other violation.

Scope limits

Chapter 209 does not reach every Texas community.

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Section 209.003(b): "Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, this chapter applies only to a property owners' association that requires mandatory membership in the association for all or a majority of the owners of residential property within the subdivision subject to the association's dedicatory instruments." The subsection carries its own carve-out in its opening words. A voluntary civic association with no mandatory membership falls outside the chapter's general reach, but not outside every section of it: Section 209.0055 applies by its own terms to an association that, among other conditions, "does not require membership in the corporation by the owners of the property within the defined area."

Section 209.003(c) makes the label irrelevant: a "homeowners' association," a "community association," or a similar designation in the restrictions or dedicatory instrument all fall within the chapter.

Section 209.003(d) is decisive for unit owners: "This chapter does not apply to a condominium as defined by Section 81.002 or 82.003." A condominium is governed instead by Chapter 82, or, for a pre-1994 regime that never opted in, by Chapter 81 (Section 81.0011(a)).

Section 209.003(e) exempts one narrow class from six listed sections: "The following provisions of this chapter do not apply to a property owners' association that is a mixed-use master association that existed before January 1, 1974, and that does not have the authority under a dedicatory instrument or other governing document to impose fines" -- Sections 209.005(c), 209.0056, 209.0057, 209.0058, 209.00592, and 209.0062. Section 209.006 is not on that list, so the notice requirement still applies to such an association.

Section 209.0061 carries two further limits of its own.

First, Section 209.0061(a): "This section does not apply to a property owners' association that is not authorized by the association's dedicatory instrument to levy a fine."

Second, Section 209.0061 is new law. It was added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 666 (H.B. 614), Sec. 1, effective January 1, 2024, and H.B. 614, Section 2 ties it to the due date rather than the levy date: the new section applies only to a fine that "becomes due on or after the" effective date of the Act. "A fine that becomes due before the" effective date is "governed by the law in effect" immediately before that date, that prior law being "continued in effect for that purpose." H.B. 614, Section 3: "This Act takes effect January 1, 2024."

Neither H.B. 614 nor Chapter 209 defines when a fine "becomes due." The text does not say whether that is the date the fine is levied, the payment date stated in the notice, or the close of the billing cycle in which the charge appears. For a fine levied near January 1, 2024, the statute therefore does not settle whether Section 209.0061 or the prior law governs; the answer can turn on the association's own payment terms, which Chapter 209 does not address.

One point about Section 209.0061 that its due-date limit does not change: the fine schedule it requires is not a cap. Section 209.0061(c) allows the enforcement policy to "reserve the board's authority to levy a fine from the schedule of fines that varies on a case-by-case basis."

Penalty detail

The concrete leverage a Texas owner does have, all of it non-monetary or defensive, and each item with its own limit.

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(1) Section 209.006(e): a timely cure means "a fine may not be assessed for the violation" -- the violation cured, not others.

Deadline detail

30 days for the owner to request a hearing -- but ONLY where the owner is entitled to cure, so this deadline does not exist at all in some of the most common fine scenarios.

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Section 209.006(b)(2)(B) requires the notice to inform the owner that the owner "may request a hearing under Section 209.007 on or before the 30th day after the date the notice was mailed to the owner." Note the clock runs from the date of MAILING, not the date of receipt. The underlying right, however, is conditional: Section 209.007(a) reads, "Except as provided by Subsection (d) and only if the owner is entitled to an opportunity to cure the violation, the owner has the right to submit a written request for a hearing to discuss and verify facts and resolve the matter in issue before the board." Section 209.006(g) provides that "a violation is considered uncurable if the violation has occurred but is not a continuous action or a condition capable of being remedied by affirmative action," adding that "the nonrepetition of a one-time violation or other violation that is not ongoing is not considered an adequate remedy." Section 209.006(h) gives the statutory examples of uncurable acts: shooting fireworks; an act constituting a threat to health or safety; a noise violation that is not ongoing; property damage, including the removal or alteration of landscape; and holding a garage sale or other event prohibited by a dedicatory instrument. Section 209.006(i) gives the curable examples: a parking violation; a maintenance violation; the failure to construct improvements or modifications in accordance with approved plans and specifications; and an ongoing noise violation such as a barking dog. So there is no 30-day hearing right over one-time fireworks, a single non-ongoing noise complaint, or landscape damage. The window also falls away entirely under Section 209.006(d) (prior Section 209.006 notice for that violation in the preceding six months) and under Section 209.007(d) (the association filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief, or a suit including foreclosure as a cause of action). On the condominium side, Section 82.102(d)(2) requires the notice to state "that not later than the 30th day after the date of the notice, the unit owner may request a hearing before the board to contest the fine or damage charge" -- but Section 82.102(d) reaches only a condominium whose declaration was recorded on or after January 1, 1994, or one that opted into Chapter 82 under Section 82.002(a)(1) or (a)(2).

The full timetable a Texas subdivision HOA must meet, where the framework applies at all -- that is, where the violation is curable under Section 209.006(g)-(i) and neither Section 209.006(d) nor Section 209.007(d) has switched the framework off. The owner has until the 30th day after the notice was mailed to request a hearing (Sec. 209.006(b)(2)(B)). Once the board receives that request, Section 209.007(c) provides: "The association shall hold a hearing under this section not later than the 30th day after the date the board receives the owner's request for a hearing and shall notify the owner of the date, time, and place of the hearing not later than the 10th day before the date of the hearing. The board or the owner may request a postponement, and, if requested, a postponement shall be granted for a period of not more than 10 days. Additional postponements may be granted by agreement of the parties. The owner or the association may make an audio recording of the meeting." So the 10-day postponement is available as of right on request by either side, further postponements require agreement of the parties, and the owner has an express statutory right to audio-record the hearing -- worth stating in a letter. Section 209.007(f) requires the association, "Not later than 10 days before the association holds a hearing under this section," to provide the owner "a packet containing all documents, photographs, and communications relating to the matter the association intends to introduce at the hearing"; Section 209.007(g) provides that if the association misses that deadline, "an owner is entitled to an automatic 15-day postponement of the hearing." Section 209.007(h) requires the association to present its case first. Separately, the cure deadline itself has no fixed number of days: Section 209.006(c) requires only that the date specified in the notice "must provide a reasonable period to cure the violation if the violation is of a curable nature and does not pose a threat to public health or safety."

On the condominium side, Section 82.102(e) provides that "The association must give notice of a levied fine or damage charge to the unit owner not later than the 30th day after the date of levy" -- but that deadline exists only for a condominium whose declaration was recorded on or after January 1, 1994, or one that opted into Chapter 82 under Section 82.002(a)(1) or (a)(2). Section 82.002(c), which enumerates the Chapter 82 provisions reaching a pre-1994 condominium, picks up from Section 82.102 only "82.102(a)(1)-(7), (a)(12)-(21), (f), and (g)"; subsection (e) is not on that list, and unlike subsection (d) it is not incorporated by reference into any subsection that is on the list. For a pre-1994 condominium that never opted in, this 30-day post-levy notice deadline does not exist. Confirm the declaration's recording date before asserting it.

Condominium rule

For a Texas condominium, Chapter 209 does not apply (Sec. 209.003(d)). The governing fine-notice provision is Property Code Section 82.102(d) -- BUT ONLY for a condominium whose declaration was recorded on or after January 1, 1994 (Sec.

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82.002(a)), or one that opted into Chapter 82 by recorded owner amendment or by a pre-1994 declaration or amendment stating the chapter would apply in its entirety on January 1, 1994 (Sec. 82.002(a)(1)-(2)). For any other condominium, read the condominium_scope_limit field before asserting Section 82.102(d).

Where it applies, Section 82.102(d) requires that before an association "may charge the unit owner for property damage for which the unit owner is liable or levy a fine for violation of the declaration, bylaws, or rules, the association shall give to the unit owner a written notice that: (1) describes the violation or property damage and states the amount of the proposed fine or damage charge; (2) states that not later than the 30th day after the date of the notice, the unit owner may request a hearing before the board to contest the fine or damage charge; and (3) allows the unit owner a reasonable time, by a specified date, to cure the violation and avoid the fine unless the unit owner was given notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure a similar violation within the preceding 12 months." So on the condominium side the repeat-violation window is TWELVE months and it is keyed to a "similar violation" -- both differ from the subdivision rule in Section 209.006(d), which is six months and is not limited to similar violations.

Four further condominium points, each with its own limit. (1) Section 82.102(a)(12) permits only "reasonable fines" and only "if notice and an opportunity to be heard are given in accordance with Subsection (d)" -- but Section 82.102(a) opens "Unless otherwise provided by the declaration," so the fining power itself can be withheld or narrowed by the declaration, and a declaration that does not authorize fines leaves the association with no fining power at all. (2) Section 82.102(e) requires the association to "give notice of a levied fine or damage charge to the unit owner not later than the 30th day after the date of levy" -- but that subsection, unlike (a)(12), does not reach a pre-1994 condominium that never opted in. (3) Section 82.102(d) does not specify a mailing method at all, unlike Section 209.006(b)(4), so there is no condominium analogue to the certified/verified mail argument, and Section 82.102(e) expressly permits the association to give a copy of the (d) notice to an occupant of the unit. (4) Section 209.017's justice-court venue is for "a violation of this chapter" -- Chapter 209 -- so it is not available to a condominium unit owner, whose claim for relief arises instead under Section 82.161(a), with two-way attorney's fees under Section 82.161(b) that also expose a losing owner.

Demand letter hook

The strongest Texas demand-letter posture, in order.

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(1) A demand that the association produce proof it sent the Section 209.006 notice by certified mail (Sec. 209.006(a)) and by verified mail to the owner's last known address as shown on association records (Sec. 209.006(b)(4)) -- that is, evidence of mailing from the United States Postal Service or a common carrier, per the Sec. 209.002(13) definition. Associations routinely email or hand-deliver and cannot meet this. The point holds only where the owner never affirmatively opted into an alternative notice method under Sec. 209.0042(b), which would make email or hand delivery lawful.

(2) A demand that the notice show the four required contents of Section 209.006(b), especially the specific cure date required by (b)(3) and the 30-day hearing advisory required by (b)(2)(B). A notice missing the cure date is defective on its face for a curable violation.

(3) Where the owner cured, Section 209.006(e) -- "a fine may not be assessed for the violation" -- is an absolute bar for that violation.

(4) For a fine that became due on or after January 1, 2024, a demand for the association's Section 209.0061 enforcement policy and fine schedule, showing that the fine exceeds the schedule or is absent from it. The association's answer is likely to be Sec. 209.0061(c), which permits the policy to reserve case-by-case discretion to vary from the schedule.

(5) Section 209.008(b) strips any attorney's fees incurred before the hearing concluded or, where no hearing was requested, before the hearing deadline passed.

(6) Where the association is threatening foreclosure over fines alone, Section 209.009 applies -- but only where the lien debt consists solely of the listed items.

(7) Section 209.017 places venue in the justice court of a precinct in which all or part of the subdivision is located, subject to the $20,000 Section 27.031(a)(1) limit, and Sec. 209.007(e) permits alternative dispute resolution if the association prefers it.

Three gating conditions come before any of this, and each can void the letter's main argument. (a) Whether the violation is curable under Sec. 209.006(g)-(i): if it is not -- fireworks, a one-time noise complaint, property damage including landscape alteration, a prohibited garage sale -- then points (2) and (3) and the entire hearing argument fall away under Sec. 209.007(a). (b) Whether the owner already received a Section 209.006 notice for the same violation, together with the opportunity to exercise rights under that section, within the preceding six months: if so, points (1) and (2) collapse under Sec. 209.006(d). (c) Whether the association has filed a suit seeking a temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief, or a suit pleading foreclosure as a cause of action, which switches off Sections 209.006 and 209.007 entirely under Sec. 209.007(d) -- in that posture the owner's move is a motion to compel mediation, which Sec. 209.007(d) expressly preserves.

Section 202.004 and Section 5.006 have no place in an owner's letter, because each runs in the association's direction: Section 202.004(a) presumes the association's discretionary decision reasonable and Section 202.004(c) exposes the violating owner to court-assessed civil damages, while Section 5.006(a) awards fees only to a prevailing party who asserted the covenant action, ordinarily the association. Raising either describes the owner's own exposure. And what the statute supports is a demand that the fine be voided and removed from the ledger, not a promise that it will be -- the letter's force comes from stating what the statute requires and what the association failed to do.

Enforcement agency

None. Texas has no state agency that enforces homeowners' association fine law, investigates HOA complaints, or has authority to void a fine. Enforcement is entirely private.

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The only state-level touchpoint is the Texas Real Estate Commission, whose role is expressly limited by Section 209.004(b-1): "The Texas Real Estate Commission shall only collect the management certificate and amended management certificate for the purpose of making the data accessible to the general public through an Internet website." TREC operates that database at hoa.texas.gov. It is a records repository, not a regulator -- do not tell an owner they can complain to TREC or to the Texas Attorney General and get a fine reversed. The database is still operationally useful: it identifies the association's officially recorded name, mailing address, and managing agent, which is where a demand letter should be addressed. the Texas HOA Management Certificate database, operated by the Texas Real Estate Commission. Section 209.004(b-1) requires a property owners' association to file its management certificate, and any amended certificate, electronically with the Commission, and directs the Commission to collect them "for the purpose of making the data accessible to the general public through an Internet website." Because the certificate must state the name of the association and its mailing address (Sec. 209.004(a)(2), (a)(5)), this database is where an owner can confirm the association's exact legal name and the address to mail to before sending anything. As of September 2026 the database listed 17,207 management certificates in total, covering 15,037 property owners' associations and 2,170 condominium unit owners' associations; those totals rise as new certificates are filed. The Commission's own site is https://www.trec.texas.gov/

Service requirement

Texas imposes a two-part mail requirement that a letter can quote precisely, because associations frequently satisfy one and not the other -- though the requirement is defeasible by owner opt-in, which matters before any service argument is built on it.

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Section 209.006(a) requires that the association "must give written notice to the owner by certified mail." Separately, Section 209.006(b)(4) requires that the notice "be sent by verified mail to the owner at the owner's last known address as shown on the association records." "Verified mail" is defined at Section 209.002(13): "'Verified mail' means any method of mailing for which evidence of mailing is provided by the United States Postal Service or a common carrier." A single USPS Certified Mail mailing ordinarily satisfies both, because Certified Mail service itself furnishes evidence of mailing. That last step is not settled by the chapter: Chapter 209 defines "verified mail" but nowhere defines "certified mail," so treating one certified mailing as meeting both subsections rests on what Certified Mail service provides rather than on any words in the statute. A notice hand-delivered, emailed, or sent by ordinary first-class mail satisfies neither subsection, and an association that cannot produce evidence of mailing to the owner's last known address as shown in its own records has not met Section 209.006(b)(4).

The defeasibility hook, which comes ahead of the service argument. Under Section 209.0042(a) an association may adopt a method it may use to provide notices to owners, and Section 209.0042(b) permits it to use that alternative method "to provide a notice for which another method is prescribed by law only if the property owner to whom the notice is provided has affirmatively opted to allow the association to use the alternative method of providing notice to provide to the owner notices for which another method is prescribed by law." So if the owner affirmatively opted in -- to email, for example -- the association may lawfully serve the Section 209.006 notice that way and the certified/verified mail argument fails. The protection for the owner is Section 209.0042(c): an association "may not require an owner to allow the association to use an alternative method of providing notice adopted under this section to provide to the owner any notice for which another method of providing notice is prescribed by law." So an opt-in extracted as a condition of something else is vulnerable. Both Section 209.006(a) and (b)(4) also fall away entirely where Section 209.006(d) or Section 209.007(d) applies.

One further limit comes from the text itself. Section 209.006(d) lifts subsections (a) and (b) for a violation for which the owner was previously given notice under the section, and the opportunity to exercise any rights available under it, in the preceding six months. But the statute does not settle what makes a later violation the same violation, and the text does not say where a continuing violation ends and a repeated one begins. No reported decision on that line is relied on here.

Cure right exception

CRITICAL AND FREQUENTLY MISSTATED. There are TWO independent exceptions that shut the notice-cure-hearing framework off, and a letter that checks only the first will overstate the owner's rights.

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EXCEPTION 1 -- Section 209.006(d), the six-month repeat-violation carve-out, which provides in full: "Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to a violation for which the owner has been previously given notice under this section and the opportunity to exercise any rights available under this section in the preceding six months." Three points a letter must get right. (1) The window is SIX months for a subdivision HOA under Chapter 209 -- not twelve. Twelve months is the CONDOMINIUM figure under Section 82.102(d)(3), and the two are routinely confused. (2) Section 209.006(d) does not use the word "similar" -- the word appears nowhere in Section 209.006. It applies to "a violation for which the owner has been previously given notice under this section." The "similar violation" language belongs to the condominium provision, Section 82.102(d)(3). (3) When Subsection (d) applies it switches off Subsections (a) and (b) together, so the association owes the owner no certified-mail notice, no cure statement, and no hearing advisory at all. The knock-on effect reaches the hearing right too: Section 209.007(a) grants a hearing "only if the owner is entitled to an opportunity to cure the violation," so a repeat violation inside the six-month window strips the hearing right as well.

EXCEPTION 2 -- Section 209.007(d), which is broader and can be triggered by the association unilaterally. It provides: "The notice and hearing provisions of Section 209.006 and this section do not apply if the association files a suit seeking a temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief or files a suit that includes foreclosure as a cause of action. If a suit is filed relating to a matter to which those sections apply, a party to the suit may file a motion to compel mediation. The notice and hearing provisions of Section 209.006 and this section do not apply to a temporary suspension of a person's right to use common areas if the temporary suspension is the result of a violation that occurred in a common area and involved a significant and immediate risk of harm to others in the subdivision. The temporary suspension is effective until the board makes a final determination on the suspension action after following the procedures prescribed by this section." The practical consequence is that an association that sues first -- for a temporary restraining order, temporary injunctive relief, or in any suit pleading foreclosure as a cause of action -- bypasses the entire notice-and-hearing framework, though a party to that suit may then file a motion to compel mediation. The same subsection also removes the framework for a temporary common-area suspension arising from a common-area violation that involved a significant and immediate risk of harm to others in the subdivision.

Practical consequence for a demand letter: before asserting a cure or hearing violation, confirm both that the owner received no prior Section 209.006 notice for that violation in the preceding six months and that the association has not filed a qualifying suit. If either exception applies, these arguments are unavailable and the letter must rest on other grounds (the fine schedule under Sec. 209.0061, the attorney's fee bar under Sec. 209.008(b), or the foreclosure bar under Sec. 209.009).

Common error to avoid

Six claims about Texas HOA fines circulate widely in summaries of this area, and all six are wrong.

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First, the Section 209.006(d) repeat-violation exception runs on a six-month window, not twelve months. Twelve months is the condominium rule in Section 82.102(d)(3).

Second, Section 209.006(d) is not limited to a "similar" violation. That word appears in Section 82.102(d)(3) and nowhere in Section 209.006, which speaks of "a violation for which the owner has been previously given notice under this section."

Third, the cure right and the 30-day hearing right are not unconditional. The cure right applies only to a violation that is "of a curable nature and does not pose a threat to public health or safety"; Section 209.006(g)-(h) list uncurable examples including fireworks, a non-ongoing noise violation, property damage, and holding a prohibited garage sale; and Section 209.007(a) grants a hearing "only if the owner is entitled to an opportunity to cure the violation." Both rights also disappear under Section 209.007(d) if the association sues first.

Fourth, Texas does not cap HOA fines at $200 per day. Section 202.004(c) caps court-assessed civil damages against a covenant violator, not association fines, and Chapter 209 itself sets no cap on the amount of a fine. Whether any Texas law outside Chapter 209 limits the amount is not answered by the chapter.

Fifth, Section 202.004 and Section 5.006 are not owner-favorable. Section 202.004(a) presumes the association's discretion reasonable, Section 202.004(c) runs against the violating owner, and Section 5.006(a) mandates fees only to "a prevailing party who asserted the action," normally the association.

Sixth, Section 82.102(d) and (e) do not reach every condominium. Neither applies to a condominium declared before January 1, 1994 that never opted into Chapter 82, and neither does Section 82.102(c), so the declaration's recording date determines whether they are available at all.

Enforcement agency url

https://www.hoa.texas.gov/

Condominium scope limit

MAJOR LIMIT, easy to miss. Section 82.002(a) provides that Chapter 82 "applies to all commercial, industrial, residential, and other types of condominiums in this state for which the declaration is recorded on or after January 1, 1994." A condominium declared before that date may be governed exclusively under Chapter…

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82 only if (1) the unit owners voted to amend the declaration, in accordance with the amendment process authorized by the declaration, to have the chapter apply and that amendment was filed for record in the condominium records in each county in which the condominium is located, or (2) a declaration or amendment of declaration was recorded before January 1, 1994 and states that the chapter will apply in its entirety on January 1, 1994 (Sec. 82.002(a)(1)-(2)). Otherwise Chapter 81, the Condominium Act, governs the regime -- Section 81.0011(a): "This chapter applies only to a condominium regime created before January 1, 1994. A condominium regime created on or after January 1, 1994, is governed by Chapter 82."

For an older condominium that never opted in, Section 82.002(c) applies only an enumerated list of Chapter 82 provisions: "Sections 82.005, 82.006, 82.007, 82.053, 82.054, 82.102(a)(1)-(7), (a)(12)-(21), (f), and (g), 82.108, 82.111, 82.113, 82.114, 82.116, 82.118, 82.157, and 82.161." From Section 82.102 that list picks up only (a)(1)-(7), (a)(12)-(21), (f), and (g). Section 82.102(d) is not on it. Neither is Section 82.102(c). Neither is Section 82.102(e). Section 82.002(c) further provides that the listed sections "apply only with respect to events and circumstances occurring on or after January 1, 1994, and do not invalidate existing provisions of the declaration, bylaws, or plats or plans of a condominium for which the declaration was recorded before January 1, 1994."

So before sending a condominium fine letter, check the recording date of the declaration. If it predates January 1, 1994 and the owners did not opt in, do NOT assert Section 82.102(d) as a freestanding requirement, do NOT assert Section 82.102(e)'s 30-day post-levy notice, and do NOT assert Section 82.102(c)'s bar on arbitrary or capricious rules -- none of the three reaches that condominium of its own force. What does reach it is Section 82.102(a)(12), which lets the board impose only "reasonable fines for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules of the association" and only "if notice and an opportunity to be heard are given in accordance with Subsection (d)" -- so the (d) procedure operates as an internal condition on the fine power even there. That internal-cross-reference reading is the strongest fair argument available, but it is an inference from the statutory text and no Texas decision confirming it was checked in this pass, so state it as an argument rather than as settled law. Section 82.161 is on the Section 82.002(c) list and does apply, giving a person or class of persons adversely affected by a violation of the chapter, declaration, or bylaws "a claim for appropriate relief" -- with two-way attorney's fees under Section 82.161(b) that also expose a losing owner. Chapter 81 itself supplies no help on fines: a scan of its full text for "fine" and "penalt" returns zero hits, and its substantive sections cover creation of the regime, declaration contents, apartment and common-element ownership, bylaws, maintenance, insurance, records, and assessments -- no fine notice or hearing procedure at all. So for a pre-1994 condominium the fine procedure comes from the declaration and bylaws, plus Section 82.102(a)(12).

Standard of review headwind

A Texas demand letter should attack procedure, not judgment, and should generally not cite Chapter 202 at all. Section 202.004(a) provides: "An exercise of discretionary authority by a property owners' association or other representative designated by an owner of real property concerning a restrictive covenant is…

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presumed reasonable unless the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the exercise of discretionary authority was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory." That presumption runs in the association's favor and describes a burden the owner would have to carry, not a rule the owner can invoke. Section 202.004(c) adds exposure on the same side of the ledger: "A court may assess civil damages for the violation of a restrictive covenant in an amount not to exceed $200 for each day of the violation" -- assessed against the party found to have violated the covenant, which in a fine dispute is the owner. Section 202.002(a) makes Chapter 202 apply "to all restrictive covenants regardless of the date on which they were created," so the presumption cannot be avoided by pointing to an old declaration. The practical effect is that arguing that the grass was not really too long starts from a legal presumption against the owner, whereas arguing that the association never sent certified mail, never specified a cure date, and never adopted a fine schedule does not. If Section 202.004 is mentioned in an owner's letter at all, frame it only as the burden the owner would carry -- never as a rule favoring the owner -- and do not surface the Section 202.004(c) per-day figure to the association as though it were the owner's remedy.

Defeasible by governing documents

Mixed -- read this before drafting. Section 209.006 itself contains no clause declaring that it overrides a contrary dedicatory instrument.

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That silence is conspicuous, because the Legislature added exactly such clauses elsewhere in the same chapter: Section 209.0041(f) and Section 209.0056(b) ("This section supersedes any contrary requirement in a dedicatory instrument"), Section 209.00592(f) ("This section supersedes any contrary provision in a dedicatory instrument"), and Section 209.00593(a) and Section 209.014(a) ("Notwithstanding any provision in a dedicatory instrument"). A scan of Chapter 209 finds no general anti-waiver clause, and Section 209.006 is not among the section-specific ones. Section 209.006 is nevertheless best read as mandatory rather than defeasible, because it is drafted as a flat precondition on the association's power ("Before a property owners' association may ... levy a fine ... the association or its agent must give written notice"), not as a default rule subject to the declaration. Treat it as mandatory but do not tell the owner the statute expressly overrides their CCRs, because it does not say so.

One part of the Section 209.006 framework IS expressly defeasible by owner consent: under Section 209.0042(b) an association may use an alternative notice method for a notice "for which another method is prescribed by law" if the owner "has affirmatively opted" in -- though Section 209.0042(c) forbids the association from requiring that opt-in.

On the condominium side the position is clearer and worse for the owner in one respect: Section 82.102(a) opens "Unless otherwise provided by the declaration," so the very power to levy fines under Section 82.102(a)(12) can be withheld or narrowed by the declaration -- meaning a condominium declaration that does not authorize fines leaves the association with no fining power at all, which is a defense worth checking. Section 82.102(d) carries no such qualifier and applies on its own terms to a condominium governed by Chapter 82, but see condominium_scope_limit for the pre-1994 recording-date carve-out that keeps (d) from reaching older condominiums at all. Separately, Section 209.0061(a) makes the fine-policy requirement inapplicable where the dedicatory instrument does not authorize fines, and Section 209.0061(c) lets the policy itself reserve board discretion to vary from the published schedule case by case. In every case, the association's own declaration, bylaws, rules, and published fine schedule must be read alongside the statute -- they can impose stricter procedures than the statute, and those are independently enforceable.

看完上面的数字,请务必读这一段

SOURCE. Every statutory quotation on this page comes from two places: the text of Texas Property Code Chapter 209 as published by the Texas Legislature, and the enrolled text of H.B. 614, Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 666. Chapter 209 was read in full, section by section. This version was verified on September 6, 2026. No law firm blog, summary site, or AI-generated answer was used for any figure or quotation here.

CURRENCY. Chapter 209 as read carries five amendments from the 2025 regular session (Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 10 / S.B. 711 and Ch. 79 / S.B. 2629, all effective September 1, 2025). Those amendments fall in Sections 209.00505, 209.00506, 209.00507, 209.0056, and 209.00592. None of them touches Section 209.006, 209.0061, 209.007, 209.008, 209.009, or 209.017.

NEGATIVE FINDINGS ARE SOURCED. The statements that Chapter 209 sets no cap on a fine, and no damages award, multiplier, or civil penalty against an association that violates Section 209.006, describe the whole chapter rather than a gap in it. The chapter contains exactly two dollar figures -- $2,500 in Section 209.008(f)(2) and $50,000 in Section 209.0052(c) -- and neither concerns fines. Charges for association records are limited by Section 209.005(i) by reference to the rates applicable for an item under 1 T.A.C. Section 70.3, not by any dollar figure in the statute. Chapter 209 contains no general anti-waiver clause; its supersession clauses are section-specific (Sections 209.0041(f), 209.0056(b), 209.00592(f), 209.00593(a), and 209.014(a)), and Section 209.006 is not among them. Chapter 81 contains no fine procedure, so it supplies none for a pre-1994 condominium. The Chapter 82 and Chapter 81 points carried on this page come from those chapters, not from Chapter 209.

WHAT THE STATUTORY TEXT DOES NOT SETTLE. Four points on this page are limited by the text itself, and are written as limits rather than as settled law.

1. Certified mail as verified mail. Chapter 209 defines "verified mail" at Section 209.002(13) but nowhere defines "certified mail." Treating a single certified mailing as satisfying both Section 209.006(a) and Section 209.006(b)(4) rests on what Certified Mail service provides, not on words in the chapter.

2. The six-month exception. Section 209.006(d) does not define what makes a later violation the same violation, and the text draws no line between a continuing violation and a repeated one.

3. The effect of a defective notice. Section 209.006(a) is worded as a precondition on levying a fine, but no provision of Chapter 209 states that a fine levied without the notice is uncollectable, and Section 209.017 grants justice court jurisdiction without listing any remedy. The statute does not settle either question, and no reported Texas decision on the point is relied on here.

4. When a fine "becomes due." Neither H.B. 614 nor Chapter 209 defines the term, so for a fine levied near January 1, 2024 the text does not settle whether Section 209.0061 or the prior law applies.

SCOPE OF THE NEGATIVE STATEMENTS. Everything said here about the absence of a cap or a penalty is said about Chapter 209. Whether Texas law outside the chapter -- Property Code Chapter 202, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, or case law -- supplies a different limit on a fine amount or a separate claim against an association is not answered by these sections.

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