加州的信用报告错误:法律怎么规定的

我的信用报告有错误

州法

法条怎么规定的

小额诉讼上限

$12,500

Code Civ. Proc. § 116.221: "the small claims court has jurisdiction in an action brought by a natural person, if the amount of the demand does not exceed twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500)" (amended by Stats. 2023, Ch. 861 (SB 71), effective Jan. 1, 2024).

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The general ceiling for other plaintiffs is $6,250 (§ 116.220(a)(1)). A CCRAA claim for actual damages plus $100–$5,000 willful-violation punitive damages fits comfortably under $12,500 for one or two items; attorney's fees are not an issue because attorneys cannot appear for parties in California small claims court (§ 116.530), so the § 1785.31(d) fee award is a superior-court remedy. Injunctive relief under § 1785.31(b) is not available in small claims except where a statute expressly authorizes it (§ 116.220(a)(5)).

法条编号

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.1 et seq. (Division 3, Part 4, Title 1.6, "Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act"). Cite it as "et seq.", not as a numeric range: the title is heavily decimal-numbered (§§ 1785.10.1, 1785.11.1–1785.11.11, 1785.15.1–1785.15.3, 1785.16.1–1785.16.3, 1785.19.5, 1785.20.1–1785.20.6) and the chapter tables of contents on leginfo confirm those decimal sections exist.

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California is a FULL-ACT state: it has its own reinvestigation duty (§ 1785.16), its own furnisher duties (§ 1785.25), its own damages and fee-shifting (§ 1785.31), its own limitations period (§ 1785.33), its own content bans (§ 1785.13, including a 2025 medical-debt ban), its own security-freeze sections (§§ 1785.11.2–1785.11.11), and an anti-waiver clause (§ 1785.36). Per-section history notes read from leginfo on 2026-09-05: § 1785.16 last amended Stats. 2001, Ch. 354 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); § 1785.25 last amended Stats. 1993, Ch. 285 (eff. Aug. 2, 1993) — so the text Congress saved "as in effect on September 30, 1996" is the text in force today; § 1785.31 last amended Stats. 1999, Ch. 836 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); § 1785.33 last amended Stats. 1997, Ch. 768 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998, operative July 1, 1998); § 1785.13 and § 1785.3 amended Stats. 2024, Ch. 520 (SB 1061, eff. Jan. 1, 2025); § 1785.27 amended Stats. 2025, Ch. 200 (AB 1521, eff. Jan. 1, 2026); § 1785.20.6 added Stats. 2024, Ch. 520 (SB 1061, eff. Jan. 1, 2025); § 1785.11.2 last amended Stats. 2012, Ch. 645 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013); § 1785.11.11 amended Stats. 2025, Ch. 67 (AB 1170, eff. Jan. 1, 2026).

法定赔偿

Effective January 1, 2000.") opens with a damage requirement: "Any consumer who suffers damages as a result of a violation of this title by any person may bring an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction against that person to recover the following".

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Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31 (current text: "Amended by Stats. 1999, Ch. 836, Sec. 1.

The remedies then divide by state of mind. Negligent violation, § 1785.31(a)(1): "actual damages, including court costs, loss of wages, attorney’s fees and, when applicable, pain and suffering." There is no fixed statutory-damages floor for a negligent violation. Willful violation, § 1785.31(a)(2): "Actual damages as set forth in paragraph (1) above", plus "Punitive damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each violation as the court deems proper", plus "Any other relief that the court deems proper." That $100–$5,000 range is willful-only, as is the federal $100–$1,000 range under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. False pretenses, § 1785.31(a)(3): where a natural person obtains a consumer credit report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose, actual damages awarded "pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) shall be in an amount of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)." Because that floor attaches to an award under paragraph (1) as well as under (2)(A), it is not confined to willful conduct. Injunctive relief, § 1785.31(b): "Injunctive relief shall be available to any consumer aggrieved by a violation or a threatened violation of" the title, "whether or not the consumer seeks any other remedy under this section." Class actions, § 1785.31(c): "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section", a person who willfully violates a requirement of the title "may be liable for punitive damages in the case of a class action, in an amount that the court may allow", the court to consider "the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency of the violations, the resources of the violator and the number of persons adversely affected." Whether such an award is bounded by the $100–$5,000 range in (a)(2)(B) is not settled: subdivision (c) sets neither a floor nor a ceiling of its own, the statute does not say whether the (a)(2)(B) range carries over to a class action, and this page cites no decision that resolves it. Costs and fees, § 1785.31(d): "Except as provided in subdivision (e), the prevailing plaintiffs in any action commenced under this section shall be entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees." Section 1785.31(e) runs the other way for debt collectors: where the action is against a debt collector as defined in § 1788.2(c) and is related to the collection of a debt, "the debt collector shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees upon a finding by the court that the action was not brought in good faith." Section 1785.31(f): where a plaintiff only seeks and obtains injunctive relief to compel compliance with the title, costs and fees are awarded under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. Section 1785.31(g): "Nothing in this section is intended to affect remedies available under Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Adjacent penalties elsewhere in the title, each on its own facts: § 1785.19(a) — civil penalty of up to $2,500, plus costs and fees under § 1785.19(b), against anyone who knowingly and willfully obtains file access or data other than as § 1785.11 allows; § 1785.20.3(c) — punitive damages of up to $30,000 per violation against a credit grantor that extends credit without verifying identity after an address, name or SSN mismatch or an identity-theft notice.

调查期限

30 天

§ 1785.16(a) verbatim: "the consumer credit reporting agency shall within a reasonable period of time and without charge, reinvestigate and record the current status of the disputed information before the end of the 30-business-day period beginning on the date the agency receives notice of the dispute from the consumer or user".

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The dispute must be "conveyed directly to the consumer credit reporting agency by the consumer or user on behalf of the consumer" — a dispute sent only to the furnisher does not start this clock. The § 1785.15(d) model summary of rights that bureaus must hand consumers states the rule in plainer words: "the consumer credit reporting agency must then, within 30 business days, reinvestigate and modify or remove inaccurate information. The consumer credit reporting agency may not charge a fee for this service." Results notice: "within five days of completion of the reinvestigation" (§ 1785.16(d)); procedure description within 15 days of request (§ 1785.16(d)). Carvalho v. Equifax (9th Cir. 2010) requires actual inaccuracy as an element of a § 1785.16 claim.

30 BUSINESS days under Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.16(a) — LONGER than the federal 30 calendar days (15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A)), so the federal clock is the operative deadline in a demand letter and California should be cited only for its additional duties.

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Defeasible: no duty if the bureau determines the dispute is "frivolous or irrelevant" (with the § 1785.16(e) limit that contradicting file data alone is not enough); the bureau may require the dispute in writing. Grandfather status under § 1681t(b)(1)(B) unverified because the current text dates from 2001.

何时可延长

California adds no extension of its own: § 1785.16 contains no clause extending the reinvestigation period. The 45-day period is federal and narrow. It comes from 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1681j(a)(3), a paragraph headed "(3) Reinvestigations" inside the subsection headed "(a) Free annual disclosure" of § 1681j: "Notwithstanding the time periods specified in section 1681i(a)(1) of this title , a reinvestigation under that section by a consumer reporting agency upon a request of a consumer that is made after receiving a consumer report under this subsection shall be completed not later than 45 days after the date on which the request is received." It runs only where the consumer asks for the reinvestigation after receiving one of the free disclosures § 1681j(a) provides — the disclosure a nationwide agency must make "once during any 12-month period upon request of the consumer and without charge to the consumer". It is not the general federal reinvestigation deadline, and it does not sit in § 1681i(a)(1)(C). The general reinvestigation period, and the extension available when the consumer supplies information during a reinvestigation, are set by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) and (B), not by § 1681j; the text of § 1681j fixes the 45-day free-report period alone and states neither the general period nor the length of any extension. Where the 45-day period applies, which clock expires first is not settled by these texts: § 1785.16(a) runs on business days while § 1681j(a)(3) runs on calendar days, and a 30-business-day span moves with weekends and public holidays, so it can approach or pass 45 calendar days. Neither statute states a rule for the comparison, and no blanket statement that the California period is always the longer one — or always the shorter one — holds.

征信局的义务

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.16(a): a consumer credit reporting agency must, without charge, reinvestigate and record the current status of disputed information "before the end of the 30-business-day period beginning on the date the agency receives notice of the dispute", and must notify the furnisher "before the end of the five-business-day period" after receiving the dispute.

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The agency "may require that disputes by consumers be in writing." The duty is defeated if the agency "has reasonable grounds to believe and determines that the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant, including by reason of a failure of the consumer to provide sufficient information" — but § 1785.16(e) says contradicting information in the file "shall not, in and of itself, constitute reasonable grounds" for that finding. Under Carvalho v. Equifax, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010), a § 1785.16 claim also requires that the disputed item actually be inaccurate.

What § 1785.16 adds beyond 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, each with its own limit: (1) Clock: 30 BUSINESS days (§ 1785.16(a)). The general federal reinvestigation period sits in 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1681i(a)(1), which is not among the texts quoted on this page; this page therefore states neither that period nor which of the two deadlines falls first. Section 1785.16 is cited here as the source of the extra duties below. (2) Furnisher notice within 5 business days (§ 1785.16(a)) — federal § 1681i(a)(2) is also 5 business days, so no practical difference. (3) Written results "within five days of completion of the reinvestigation" (§ 1785.16(d)), including a revised report, an explanation of any change the consumer sought that was not made, and a description of the procedure used "not later than 15 days after receiving a request from the consumer." (4) Reinsertion requires furnisher certification of accuracy, with written notice to the consumer within 5 business days (§ 1785.16(c)). (5) Consumer statement of dispute of up to 100 words (§ 1785.16(f)–(g)). (6) Notification to prior recipients on request — 2 years back for employment reports, 12 months for others (§ 1785.16(h)). (7) Identity-theft block on a police report or DMV investigator report under Penal Code § 530.5 (§ 1785.16(k)), which does not apply to resellers (§ 1785.16.3). Its preemption status is unresolved. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) provides that "No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State", and § 1681t(b)(5) reaches state law only "with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of" the federal sections it lists, subparagraph (C) of which is "section 1681c-2 of this title". Unlike § 1681t(b)(1)(F)(ii) and § 1681t(b)(3)(A), paragraph (b)(5) names no state statute at all, so § 1785.16(k) — added by Stats. 2001, Ch. 354 — has no express carve-out there. Whether it falls inside (b)(5)(C) turns on whether it requires the same conduct as the specific provisions of § 1681c-2; the text of § 1681t does not settle that, and this page cites no decision that settles it. (8) Safe harbour: if the bureau deletes the item within 3 business days and confirms in writing within 5 business days, it is exempt from (d), (f) and (g) (§ 1785.16(j)). Section 1785.16 is not preempted across the board. Section 1681t(b)(3) — which covers state law "with respect to the disclosures required to be made under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (g) of section 1681g" and the credit-score disclosure in subsection (f) — expressly "shall not apply with respect to sections 1785.10, 1785.16, and 1785.20.2 of the California Civil Code (as in effect on December 4, 2003)". That carve-out reaches only the § 1681g disclosure subject matter, and only the sections as they stood on December 4, 2003. TIMING CAVEAT for every item above: § 1681t(b)(1)(B) bars state requirements on the subject matter of § 1681i, "relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in a consumer's file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on September 30, 1996". Section 1785.16 existed in 1996 and has been amended since, including by Stats. 2001, Ch. 354. Whether a particular clause of the current section sits inside that exception is not settled by the statutory text, which fixes the exception to state law "in effect on September 30, 1996" and says nothing about how it applies to a section amended after that date.

数据提供方的义务

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a): "A person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate." Congress wrote that one subdivision into the FCRA saving clause: 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) bars state requirements on the subject matter of federal § 1681s-2, "relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies", but by its own terms that paragraph does not apply "with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)". The exception is keyed to the 1996 wording of the subdivision, and § 1681t does not say how it operates if the state text is amended afterwards. The Ninth Circuit held that a consumer may enforce § 1785.25(a) privately through § 1785.31. In Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, No. 06-17226 (9th Cir., filed January 12, 2009, amended October 21, 2009), the court read the express preemption clause by its terms: "Neither California Civil Code section 1785.25(g) nor section 1785.31 imposes a requirement or prohibition." Those sections "merely provide a vehicle for private parties to enforce other sections", so § 1681t(b)(1)(F) does not reach them. Gorman did not decide conflict preemption. The furnisher there argued that private enforcement of § 1785.25(a) "is inconsistent with the purpose of the FCRA and thus is preempted under both FCRA § 1681t(a) and ordinary conflict preemption provisions", but raised the point "for the first time" on a petition for rehearing en banc, and the court held that "MBNA did not advance this contention before us initially, so the argument is waived." The court added that "Even if we were to entertain" the argument it "would reject it" — a conditional passage written after a waiver holding, not a ruling. Whether a conflict-preemption defence succeeds is therefore open. Federal § 1681s-2(a), the duty not to furnish information the furnisher knows to be inaccurate, carries no private right of action, which is what makes § 1785.25(a) the most useful California addition in a letter to a bank, lender, collector or other furnisher. Defence built into the section: § 1785.25(g) — no liability if "the furnisher establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the failure to comply with this section, the furnisher maintained reasonable procedures to comply with those provisions." SCOPE LIMIT: only subdivision (a) is saved. Carvalho v. Equifax, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010), held § 1785.25(f) (furnisher must investigate a bureau-forwarded dispute within 30 business days) preempted: "Because section 1785.25(a) is the only substantive CCRAA furnisher provision specifically saved by the FCRA, Carvalho's section 1785.25(f) claim is preempted." Subdivisions (b)–(e) (duty to correct, duty to flag disputed items, closed-account and delinquency-date reporting) sit outside the saving clause as well and carry the same preemption exposure as § 1785.25(f). Section 1785.26 (creditor must warn the consumer before or within 30 days after reporting negative information) is a furnisher duty outside the saving clause and carries that exposure too.

免费查询报告的权利

Beyond the federal annual free report (15 U.S.C. § 1681j, which California cannot expand in frequency — § 1681t(b)(4) lists no California statute among its exceptions), California adds: § 1785.17(b) — all disclosures under §§ 1785.10 and 1785.15 and all reports under § 1785.16 are free "if requested by the consumer…

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within 60 days after receipt by the consumer of a notification of adverse action"; § 1785.17(c) — no charge for the § 1785.16 dispute-result notice or for notifying prior recipients of a deletion if the consumer designates them within 30 days; § 1785.15.3(b) — an identity-theft victim who supplies a Penal Code § 530.6 police report or DMV investigator report gets "up to 12 copies of his or her file during a consecutive 12-month period, not to exceed one copy per month", capped at 12 per year; § 1785.11.3(b) — a free report at the end of a 90-day security alert. Otherwise § 1785.17(a)(1) allows a fee "not exceeding eight dollars ($8)" for a file disclosure. Practical note: these fee caps are older than the federal free-annual-report scheme and matter only for a second or later report in the same year.

管辖法律

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA)

律师费

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31(d): "the prevailing plaintiffs in any action commenced under this section shall be entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees" — one-way, mandatory ("shall"). Attorney's fees are also an element of actual damages for a negligent violation under § 1785.31(a)(1).

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LIMIT (§ 1785.31(e)): if the defendant is a debt collector under § 1788.2(c) and the action "is related to the collection of a debt", the debt collector recovers its own reasonable attorney's fees "upon a finding by the court that the action was not brought in good faith." LIMIT (§ 1785.31(f)): if the plaintiff seeks and obtains ONLY injunctive relief, fees are governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 (private attorney general doctrine) instead.

追诉时效

2 年

Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.33: "within two years from the date the plaintiff knew of, or should have known of, the violation of this title, but not more than seven years from the earliest date on which liability could have arisen". Discovery-based two-year period with a seven-year outer cap (the federal cap in 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1681p is five years). Exception: where the defendant "has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this chapter to be disclosed to a consumer" and the misrepresentation is material to liability, the action "may be brought at any time within two years after the discovery by the consumer of the misrepresentation" — this exception has no seven-year cap. Wording quirk: the section mixes "this chapter" and "this title"; it has been applied to the whole CCRAA.

最长时效上限

7 年

受理投诉的机构

California has no agency dedicated to credit reporting. Consumer complaints against a business go to the California Attorney General, Public Inquiry Unit. The Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI) also takes consumer-finance complaints.

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The CCRAA itself names no enforcing agency; the mechanism the statute provides is private enforcement by the consumer under Civ. Code § 1785.31.

Scope limits

(1) Consumer = natural individual (§ 1785.3(b)); commercial-purpose reports are not "consumer credit reports" (§ 1785.3(c)(7)).

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(2) § 1785.25(a) liability attaches only to information the furnisher "knows or should know" is incomplete or inaccurate — a good-faith furnisher that later learns of an error is reached by § 1785.25(b), which is preempted. (3) § 1785.16 requires the dispute be sent to the BUREAU (directly or through a user), and the bureau may insist it be in writing. (4) § 1785.31(a)(2)(B) punitive damages require a WILLFUL violation; negligent violations recover actual damages only. (5) The $2,500 minimum in § 1785.31(a)(3) applies only to a NATURAL PERSON who obtains a report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose — not to corporate defendants. (6) Medical-debt ban: "medical debt" (§ 1785.3(j)) is debt owed to a person "whose primary business is providing medical services, products, or devices" or its agent or assignee, includes bills "not past due or that have been paid", and EXCLUDES cosmetic surgery as defined in Health & Safety Code § 1367.63; the § 1785.27(c) contract-term requirement applies only to written contracts entered into "on or after July 1, 2025"; the ban itself is effective Jan. 1, 2025 (SB 1061) with § 1785.27 in its current form effective Jan. 1, 2026 (AB 1521). (7) Identity-theft block (§ 1785.16(k)) requires a police report or DMV-investigator report under Penal Code § 530.5 and does not bind resellers (§ 1785.16.3). (8) Protected-consumer freeze (§§ 1785.11.9–1785.11.11) applies only to persons under 16, conservatees/incapacitated persons, or foster youth under 16, and is displaced by federal § 1681c-1(j). (9) Small-claims natural-person ceiling of $12,500 applies to claims "brought by a natural person" (Code Civ. Proc. § 116.221); entities are capped at $6,250 (§ 116.220(a)(1)). (10) § 1785.35: the title does not apply to land-title reporters.

Defeasible rules

(1) Reasonable-procedures defence for FURNISHERS: § 1785.25(g) — no liability if the furnisher proves by a preponderance that it "maintained reasonable procedures to comply". (2) Same defence for CREDITORS under the negative-information notice rule: § 1785.26(d).

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(3) Same defence for USERS on adverse-action notices: § 1785.20(c), and for employment-report users: § 1785.20.5(b). (4) Bureau's frivolous-or-irrelevant determination ends the § 1785.16 reinvestigation (§ 1785.16(a)–(b)), limited by § 1785.16(e) and by the 5-business-day written notice requirement with "the specific reasons". (5) Three-day-delete safe harbour: § 1785.16(j) exempts the bureau from the results-notice, dispute-statement and flagging duties if it deletes within 3 business days and confirms in writing within 5. (6) Election bar: § 1785.34 — a pending federal § 1681n/§ 1681o action, or a final federal judgment, bars the state claim against a bureau or user "for the same act or omission". (7) Debt-collector fee shift: § 1785.31(e) — bad-faith finding exposes the plaintiff to the collector's attorney's fees. (8) Actual-inaccuracy element: Carvalho (9th Cir. 2010) requires the disputed item to be inaccurate for a § 1785.16 claim; an accurate-but-unwelcome item is not actionable. (9) Federal preemption itself (see federal_preemption_analysis) defeats §§ 1785.25(b)–(f), 1785.26, the state freeze rules, and possibly the medical-debt bans and post-1996 § 1785.16 timing clauses. (10) Anti-waiver: § 1785.36 makes any waiver of the title "void and unenforceable" and § 1785.1(g) voids contract clauses that prohibit acts the title requires — a cardholder agreement cannot contract these rights away, though an arbitration clause may still move the forum.

Enforcement agency

California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General; complaints are filed on the Public Inquiry Unit consumer complaint form.

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The CCRAA contains no state-agency enforcement section; § 1785.31 gives the consumer a direct private right of action, and § 1785.27(d) (medical debt) additionally provides that a violation "by a person holding a license or permit issued by the state shall be deemed to be a violation of the law governing that license or permit", which routes those complaints to the provider's licensing board.

Medical debt rules

California bars medical debt from credit reports at three links — bureau, furnisher and credit user — effective Jan. 1, 2025 (SB 1061, Stats. 2024, Ch. 520), with § 1785.27 re-enacted in its current form by "Amended by Stats. 2025, Ch. 200, Sec. 2.

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(AB 1521) Effective January 1, 2026." BUREAU — § 1785.13(a)(7): "No consumer credit reporting agency shall make any consumer credit report containing any of the following items of information: ... (7) Medical debt." FURNISHER — § 1785.27(a): "A person shall not furnish information regarding a medical debt to a consumer credit reporting agency." VOIDING — § 1785.27(b): "A medical debt is void and unenforceable if a person knowingly violates this section by furnishing information regarding the medical debt to a consumer credit reporting agency." That consequence turns on a knowing violation; the subdivision does not reach a furnishing made without knowledge. USER — § 1785.20.6: "A person who uses a consumer credit report in connection with a credit transaction shall not use a medical debt listed on the report as a negative factor when making a credit decision." CONTRACT TERM — § 1785.27(c)(1): "On or after July 1, 2025, it is unlawful to enter into a written contract creating a medical debt that does not include the following term:" and the prescribed notice follows. § 1785.27(c)(2): "A written contract entered into on or after July 1, 2025, that does not include the term described in paragraph (1) is void and unenforceable." That voiding requires no furnishing and no knowledge. LICENSEE HOOK — § 1785.27(d): "A violation of this section by a person holding a license or permit issued by the state shall be deemed to be a violation of the law governing that license or permit." DEFINITION LIMITS (§ 1785.3(j)): debt owed to a person "whose primary business is providing medical services, products, or devices" or its agent or assignee; includes bills "not past due or that have been paid"; excludes cosmetic surgery (Health & Safety Code § 1367.63). EFFECTIVE-DATE GAP: the text of § 1785.27 now in force took effect January 1, 2026, while subdivision (c) keys the contract term to contracts entered into on or after July 1, 2025, and the section does not say which wording governs a contract signed between July 1 and December 31, 2025. PREEMPTION IS NOT SETTLED. What the federal text does say: 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E) bars state requirements on the subject matter of § 1681c "except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on September 30, 1996", and the California exception in § 1681t(b)(1)(F) runs only "with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)". Section 1785.27 as amended in 2025 falls inside neither exception. That observation does not decide the question: § 1681t does not provide that a state law outside those exceptions is preempted for that reason alone, and this page cites no court decision resolving whether § 1785.27 survives. The CFPB interpretive rule of Oct. 28, 2025 (non-binding) and the July 11, 2025 E.D. Tex. Cornerstone consent-judgment opinion (not binding in California) read state bans of this kind as preempted; the First Circuit read the preemption clause narrowly in CDIA v. Frey (2022). So a claim that rests on § 1785.27(b) rests on unsettled ground, while an inaccuracy claim under § 1785.25(a) and federal § 1681s-2(b) does not turn on how the preemption question comes out.

Relationship to fcra

The CCRAA is a parallel state act, not a gap-filler: it duplicates most FCRA structures (permissible purposes, disclosure, reinvestigation, obsolescence, adverse-action notice) with its own remedies.

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Three things make it worth citing next to the FCRA in a California letter: (a) a private, fee-shifting claim against a FURNISHER for knowingly or negligently furnishing inaccurate data (§ 1785.25(a) + § 1785.31), which federal law does not give the consumer; (b) willful-violation punitive damages of $100–$5,000 per violation (federal: $100–$1,000 statutory plus discretionary punitive) and pain-and-suffering as an element of actual damages even for negligence; (c) a seven-year outer limitations cap versus the federal five. Where California duplicates federal law it is generally weaker or equal (30 business days vs 30 calendar days; freeze rules superseded), and where California goes beyond federal content rules (medical debt) preemption is contested. § 1785.34 forces an election: a pending or decided federal § 1681n/§ 1681o action bars a state claim against a bureau or user for the same act.

Security freeze rules

No usable California overlay in practice — federal 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(i) governs, and § 1681t(b)(1)(J) preempts state law on the same subject matter.

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California's text (§ 1785.11.2, last amended 2012) requires placement "no later than three business days after receiving a written request", confirmation within 10 business days, temporary lift within 3 business days, and still authorizes a fee "of no more than ten dollars ($10)" per placement, lift or removal (free only for identity-theft victims with a police/DMV report, and free initial placement for consumers 65 or older) — all of which is displaced by the federal rule that a freeze be placed "free of charge" within 1 business day (toll-free telephone or secure electronic request) or 3 business days (mail) and removed within 1 hour (electronic) or 3 business days (mail). Protected-consumer freezes for minors under 16, conservatees and foster youth (§§ 1785.11.9–1785.11.11, current text eff. Jan. 1, 2026) are likewise covered by federal § 1681c-1(j). One California clause outside the freeze subject matter: § 1785.11.3(a) — while a freeze is in place a bureau may not change the consumer's name, date of birth, SSN or address without written confirmation within 30 days (sent to both old and new address). Letter guidance: cite the federal freeze rule; cite § 1785.11.3(a) only for an unauthorized identity-data change.

Who is liable scope limit

§ 1785.31(a) reaches "any person" who violates the title, so both consumer credit reporting agencies AND furnishers are defendants under the state act — but the furnisher exposure is limited by federal preemption to § 1785.25(a) (knowing or should-know furnishing of incomplete or inaccurate information).

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"Consumer" means "a natural individual" (§ 1785.3(b)); business-purpose reports are excluded from the definition of "consumer credit report" (§ 1785.3(c)(7)). § 1785.35 excludes land-title reporters. § 1785.34 bars a state suit against a bureau or user while a federal § 1681n/§ 1681o action "for the same act or omission" is pending, and a final federal judgment bars any state action on the same act — so a plaintiff must choose the forum and theory once; note § 1785.34 names only "consumer credit reporting agency or user of information", not furnishers.

Federal preemption analysis

Analysis of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b), as published at uscode.house.gov, against each California provision a letter might use:

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(1) § 1785.25(a) furnisher accuracy duty — NOT preempted. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state law on furnisher responsibilities "except that this paragraph shall not apply ... (ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)". § 1785.25 was last amended in 1993, so today's text is the saved text. Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 584 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) holds the private right of action survives: "Neither California Civil Code section 1785.25(g) nor section 1785.31 imposes a requirement or prohibition. Rather, these sections merely provide a vehicle for private parties to enforce other sections". A furnisher's preemption defense is weak in the Ninth Circuit, where Gorman is binding precedent; some earlier district courts (e.g. Lin v. Universal Card Servs., N.D. Cal. 2002) went the other way, and Gorman does not bind outside the Ninth Circuit. Read together with the § 1785.31 remedies, § 1785.25(a) is accordingly the California-specific duty that stands on the firmest ground against a furnisher.

(2) § 1785.25(b)–(f) and § 1785.26 (other furnisher duties, including the 30-business-day furnisher investigation and the negative-information warning) — PREEMPTED or at high risk. Carvalho v. Equifax, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010): "Gorman holds only that the FCRA does not preempt section 1785.25(a) claims against furnishers." These subdivisions therefore do not supply a dependable state-law violation; the furnisher investigation duty that is not in doubt is the federal one in § 1681s-2(b).

(3) § 1785.16 bureau reinvestigation timing and notices — § 1681t(b)(1)(B) preempts state law on "the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action ... in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information" but "shall not apply to any State law in effect on September 30, 1996". § 1785.16 predates 1996, but the operative text was amended in 2001; Congress separately referenced § 1785.16 "as in effect on December 4, 2003" in § 1681t(b)(3)(A), but only for the disclosure-of-credit-score subject matter of § 1681g. A defendant has a real argument that any clause added after Sept. 30, 1996 is preempted. The text of § 1785.16 as it stood on September 30, 1996 is not among the texts behind this page, and § 1681t does not say how its exception applies to a section amended after that date, so whether a given clause of the current section sits inside the exception is unresolved. The deadline that does not depend on that question is the federal 30-calendar-day one; § 1785.16 adds California's written-results and procedure-description duties on top of it, and whether the state timing standing alone can carry a damages claim depends on that unresolved preemption question. Non-timing bureau duties (§ 1785.14(b) reasonable procedures for maximum possible accuracy; § 1785.16(c) reinsertion certification) are not within (b)(1)(B) and remain enforceable under § 1785.31 subject to the § 1785.34 election.

(4) Medical-debt bans (§ 1785.13(a)(7) bureau content ban; § 1785.27 furnisher ban; § 1785.20.6 user ban; all 2025–2026) — REAL preemption argument, currently unresolved for California. Bureau side: § 1681t(b)(1)(E) preempts state law on subject matter regulated under § 1681c "relating to information contained in consumer reports" except laws in effect on Sept. 30, 1996 — the California ban dates from 2025, so the grandfather does not help. Furnisher side: § 1785.27 is a furnisher prohibition and only § 1785.25(a) is saved under (b)(1)(F). Authorities pulling toward preemption: Cornerstone Credit Union League v. CFPB, No. 4:25-cv-16-SDJ, Doc. 52 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2025) (approving a consent judgment vacating the CFPB medical-debt rule): "just as an agency cannot prohibit what a federal statute explicitly permits, neither can a state law. Accordingly, any state law purporting to prohibit a CRA from furnishing a credit report with coded medical information would be inconsistent with FCRA and therefore preempted." — a Texas district court, in a case with no state party, not binding in California; and the CFPB's interpretive rule, 90 Fed. Reg. 48710 (Oct. 28, 2025), which withdraws the July 2022 rule and states the FCRA "generally preempts State laws that touch on broad areas of credit reporting", but which by its own terms "does not have the force or effect of law" and says "Parties interested in the application of FCRA preemption to particular State laws can litigate such questions in court." Authority pulling the other way: Consumer Data Industry Ass'n v. Frey, No. 20-2064 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2022), reading (b)(1)(E) narrowly and reversing a preemption ruling against Maine's medical-debt reporting limits (not binding in the Ninth Circuit). This page cites no California or Ninth Circuit decision on SB 1061, and the statutory text does not settle the question in either direction: § 1681t does not provide that a state law falling outside its exceptions is preempted for that reason alone. Because the question is open, §§ 1785.13(a)(7), 1785.27 and 1785.20.6 state California's policy and give a furnisher a reason to withdraw the item voluntarily, while the § 1785.27(b) void-debt consequence and damages for medical-debt reporting are not certainties. The federal grounds that are not in doubt for NON-veteran medical debt are § 1681b(g)(1)(C) (coded reporting) and the generic 7-year rule in § 1681c(a)(4)–(5). Sections 1681c(a)(7)–(8) apply solely to "a veteran's medical debt" reported by a nationwide consumer reporting agency described in § 1681a(p), so they reach a case only where the consumer is a veteran and the debt is for VA-related care (First Circuit, Consumer Data Indus. Ass'n v. Frey: those sections "do not preempt the Medical Debt Reporting Act insofar as it regulates non-veterans' medical debt").

(5) Security freezes (§§ 1785.11.2–1785.11.11) — PREEMPTED as to anything the federal freeze covers. § 1681t(b)(1)(J) preempts state law on subject matter regulated under "subsections (i) and (j) of section 1681c-1 of this title relating to security freezes" (adult and protected-consumer freezes respectively), and federal § 1681c-1(i)(2)(A) requires placement "free of charge" within 1 business day (electronic/phone) or 3 business days (mail). California's text still authorizes a $10 fee (§ 1785.11.2(m)) and 3 business days by mail only — the state fee clause is inoperative. The operative freeze rights are the federal ones in § 1681c-1(i).

(6) § 1785.31 damages/fees and § 1785.33 limitations — these are remedial and procedural provisions; they are not themselves "requirements or prohibitions" (Gorman) and apply to whichever substantive California duty survives. § 1785.34 is California's own election-of-remedies bar, not a preemption rule.

(7) Free-report frequency — § 1681t(b)(4) preempts state law on the frequency of § 1681j(a) disclosures and its exception list names Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Vermont, not California; California's identity-theft (12/year) and post-adverse-action free-report rights rest on other triggers rather than on § 1681j(a) frequency, and they add only modest weight to a dispute.

(8) 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5): "No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State ... (5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of— (A) section 1681c(g) of this title; (B) section 1681c–1 of this title; (C) section 1681c–2 of this title; ... (H) section 1681s–2(a)(6) of this title". This clause carries NO 1996 grandfather. It puts the § 1785.16(k)–(l) identity-theft block (conduct governed by § 1681c-2) and the § 1785.11.1 security alert and § 1785.11.3(b) free-report-on-alert items (conduct governed by § 1681c-1 fraud and active-duty alerts) at high risk; whether any of those California sections falls inside (b)(5) turns on whether it requires the same conduct as the specific federal provisions listed there, which the text of § 1681t does not settle. Until that question is answered, the federal provisions are the ones that operate in that area without depending on it, with the California sections stating California's policy alongside them.

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Sources. The California statutory text on this page (Civ. Code §§ 1785.3, 1785.11, 1785.13, 1785.16, 1785.19, 1785.20.3, 1785.20.6, 1785.25, 1785.26, 1785.27 and 1785.31) is the current text published by the California Legislature at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov; § 1785.31 carries the history line "Amended by Stats. 1999, Ch. 836, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2000." and § 1785.27 carries "Amended by Stats. 2025, Ch. 200, Sec. 2. (AB 1521) Effective January 1, 2026." Federal text is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681j and 1681t from the prelim edition at uscode.house.gov. Case law: Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, No. 06-17226 (9th Cir.), from the amended opinion marked "Filed January 12, 2009 Amended October 21, 2009"; Carvalho v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010); the Cornerstone consent-judgment opinion of July 11, 2025 (E.D. Tex.); and the CFPB interpretive rule of October 28, 2025. CDIA v. Frey (1st Cir. 2022) is named as a pointer only and is not among the texts behind these quotations. No secondary source stands behind any statement above. Quotations keep the punctuation of the copies read, including the copy of the Gorman opinion, which renders apostrophes as blank space (so "MBNA s" appears where the opinion reads "MBNA's"). These texts were read on September 5–6, 2026.

What these texts do not settle. Six points on this page are stated as open rather than decided. (1) Whether § 1785.27's medical-debt furnishing ban survives FCRA preemption: § 1681t(b)(1)(E) holds its exception to state law "in effect on September 30, 1996" and § 1681t(b)(1)(F) holds its California exception to "section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)", and the 2025 text of § 1785.27 falls inside neither — but § 1681t does not provide that a state law outside those exceptions is preempted for that reason alone, and no decision resolving the question is cited here. (2) Which wording of § 1785.27 governs a written contract entered into between July 1 and December 31, 2025, the text now in force having taken effect January 1, 2026. (3) Whether § 1785.16(k) falls inside § 1681t(b)(5)(C), which turns on whether it requires the same conduct as the specific provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2. (4) Whether any clause of the current § 1785.16 sits inside § 1681t(b)(1)(B)'s exception for state law in effect on September 30, 1996, that section having been amended since, including by Stats. 2001, Ch. 354. (5) Whether a class-action punitive award under § 1785.31(c) is bounded by the $100–$5,000 range in § 1785.31(a)(2)(B). (6) How California's 30-business-day reinvestigation clock compares with the federal 45-day period in § 1681j(a)(3): the general federal reinvestigation period and any extension sit in 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1), which is not among the texts quoted here. One limit on the case law: in Gorman, conflict preemption under 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) was addressed only after the court held the argument waived, and in terms that begin "Even if we were to entertain", so that passage decides nothing.

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